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The Afghan opium economy presents a clear and present danger to international security as it 
enhances the chances of failed states emerging, of stable regions destabilising, and of human 
poverty, addiction, and disease proliferating. The root cause of the Afghan opium economy is 
the great number of domestic farmers who cultivate the crop. Thus, the factors that compel 
rural farmers to cultivate opium cause the manifestation of the opium economy in 
Afghanistan, and the subsequent insecurity that afflicts the international community. In this 
article, the root causes and security implications of the Afghan opium economy are analysed, 
and several policy options and recommendations are presented and evaluated. The illegal 
opium economy in Afghanistan is not a recent phenomenon. To date, there has been a 
reliance on traditional approaches to combat the drug problem in the country. This must stop. 
There are no quick and easy solutions. Instead, there are only long and multi-layered 
solutions, which need commitment, support, and open-mindedness. The world community 
must understand this, and act upon it. Otherwise, the opium economy will continue to 
dominate in Afghanistan, and insecurity will continue to plague much of the international 
community. 
Probable causes 
During its war in Afghanistan (1979-1989), the Soviet Union (SU) encountered stiff resistance 
from mujahidin guerillas. Rural Afghanis backed these mujahidin, and provided them with 
support in the form food, water, shelter, and medical aid [1]. In hopes of harming the rural 
population and thereby weakening the mujahidin’s support network, the SU attacked the 
agricultural sector [2]; aerial sorties destroyed vital infrastructure such as roads and irrigation 
systems [3], and scorched earth campaigns turned ‘entire regions that once were fertile (into) 
areas of barren waste’ [4]. From a Soviet standpoint, these tactics were successful, as the 
cultivation of licit crops traditionally grown by Afghani farmers declined during the war [5]. 
Corresponding with this decline was a rise in opium cultivation, as farmers increasingly 
switched to the illicit crop during the war [6]. This switch occurred because traditional crops 
need fertile land, irrigation, and quick road access to markets [7], whereas opium can grow on 
2 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2007  
 
 
 
most types of soil, it requires minimal irrigation, and its lightweight and non-perishable nature 
allow for easy transport [8].  
Although the SU left Afghanistan, the conditions that compelled farmers to switch to 
opium cultivation remained. Governmental neglect is to blame for this, as rural reconstruction 
was never a priority for the Communist (1978-1992), Mujahidin (1992-1996), or Taliban 
regimes (1996-2001) that ruled Afghanistan [9]. The collapse of the Taliban in 2001 ended this 
trend of neglect. In its place came a new era marked by increased reconstruction and 
development programmes. However, this increase occurred, and continues to occur, in an 
uneven pattern [10].  
Uneven patterns occur due to security issues, as reconstruction programmes may only take 
place in regions deemed sufficiently secure [11]. Due to this condition, the insecure 
agriculturally oriented countryside has not been a focal point of reconstruction and 
development efforts. Consequently, much of the infrastructure damaged in the past has 
remained unusable [12]. These dynamics are similar to the Cold War dynamics, as 
infrastructural constraints continue to hinder the cultivation of licit crops. Given that these 
infrastructural limitations do not apply to opium cultivation, it is understandable why farmers 
currently choose to grow this crop.  
Additional incentive for cultivating opium results from the nature of Afghanistan’s 
informal banking system. Most farmers take out loans on a yearly basis in order to satisfy basic 
needs such as purchasing food, clothing, medical services, and agricultural inputs [13]. The 
most widely used method of obtaining loans involves opium as a source of credit; farmers 
receive a loan by agreeing to cultivate a predetermined amount of opium that is to be 
transferred to the creditor at a later date [14]. This particular method is in wide use because 
opium provides the greatest access to loans, and the most favourable interest rates, when 
compared to other forms of credit [15]. With so many needs to satisfy, and so few means for 
satisfying these needs, it is only natural that farmers would choose the opium option.  
Unfortunately, satisfying these needs became increasingly difficult for opium farmers in 
recent years, as widespread crop failure, governmental bans, and eradication efforts caused 
yields to be lower than expected [16]. Lower yields led some farmers to initially default on their 
loans, as they were unable to grow the predetermined amount of opium. While some were 
eventually able to repay their loans, others were less fortunate; as of 2005, over one–third of 
farmers had an outstanding loan to pay [17].  
Farmers with outstanding loans have several means with which they can manage their 
debt. They may opt to sell or mortgage their land, give their daughter to marriage, grow licit 
crops, or work wage labour to supplement their farm earning [18]. Alternatively, they may 
choose to cultivate opium. This latter option is the one that is the most preferred and widely 
employed, as many consider it the best debt management strategy in contemporary 
Afghanistan [19]. At an age where debts have proliferated, this preference has contributed 
significantly to the rising levels of opium cultivation in the country. 
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Security implications 
Weakening of the Afghan state 
 
According to Antonio Maria Costa, director of the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and 
Crime, the Afghan opium economy is ‘now a clear and present danger’ [20]. Costa is of the 
belief that ‘there is a palpable risk that Afghanistan will again turn into a failed state’ [21]. State 
failure is quite possible given the prominence of the opium economy, and the adverse 
influence that this economy has on Afghanistan’s stability. Elucidating this influence is the 
Failed State Index as espoused by the Fund for Peace [22]. The Failed State Index calculates 
Afghanistan’s proximity to becoming a failed state based on twelve indicators that have 
historically been prominent in bringing about failure to a nation. Of the twelve indicators, 
numerous are closely related to, and exacerbated by, the Afghan opium economy [23].  
Enhancing the scope of the external intervention in Afghanistan is the fact that foreign 
forces have been, and continue to be, involved in counter-narcotic operations. Operations of 
this sort have worked to antagonise certain Afghan parties. Some of these parties have 
responded by sending their opium-funded security apparatuses who operate as a ‘state within a 
state’ to wage violent campaigns, in hopes of stifling the counter-narcotic efforts [24]. In turn, 
these campaigns of violence have caused the displacement of thousands of people [25], which 
has intensified the movement of internally displaced persons. Campaigns of opium-funded 
violence have as well led to uneven patterns of development. Uneven patterns arise because 
areas that are free of opium funded-violence receive more development assistance than regions 
that are plagued by the same type of violence [26]. The further exacerbation of these factors by 
the presence of the opium economy may cause Afghanistan to degenerate into a failed state. It 
would be very detrimental if such a scenario were to materialise, as ‘failed states serve as safe 
havens and staging grounds for terrorist activities, and create environments that spur wider 
regional conflict which carry significant security costs to neighboring countries’ [27].  
Strengthening the Taliban 
Recent reports suggest that resurgent Taliban forces have forged an alliance with opium 
traffickers; in return for protecting traffickers and farmers, the Taliban receives a share of the 
profits accrued from the opium trade [28]. Taliban forces in turn use this capital to finance 
weapons and equipment procurement [29], to pay combatant wages [30], and to entice recruits 
to join their cause [31]. With more weapons, equipment, and operatives, the Taliban is better 
able to wage its insurgency campaign. This opium-funded campaign undermines human 
security at present time, and it has the capacity to continue doing so in the future.  
Human security suffers presently due to the Taliban’s use of tactics that aim to terrorise 
the population [32]. In the future, human security will suffer if the Taliban’s opium-funded 
campaign propels them back into power. This is the case, as the Taliban, during its previous 
stint in power, and throughout its recent campaign, have shown a flagrant and constant 
disregard for the human rights of women [33]. It is likely that this disregard would continue 
and become even more pervasive if the Taliban reassume control in Afghanistan.  
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Strengthening of al Qaeda 
Islamic charities sympathetic to al Qaeda’s cause have historically been its main source of 
financing. The anti-terror campaigns that ensued following 9/11 targeted charities of this 
nature, and in the process diminished their ability to divert funds to al Qaeda [34]. To offset 
this loss of income, al Qaeda, according to the American intelligence community, ‘has turned 
to the poppy fields of Afghanistan as barter to finance its operations’ [35]. More specifically, al 
Qaeda generates capital by levying a tax on each opium shipment that passes through its area 
of influence [36]. Capital accrued in this manner is subsequently used by al Qaeda to fund its 
operations in Afghanistan, and in areas of the former SU [37]. Regions where al Qaeda is active 
may in turn suffer through episodes of indiscriminate violence that have the potential to inflict 
death and injury to many. 
Weakening of security in the region 
A majority of Afghani opium ends up in Europe after being trafficked through Central Asia 
[38]. Corrupt government officials in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Georgia help 
facilitate the flow of drugs through the region [39]. This poses a threat to international security 
because corrupt regimes tend to breed poverty and terrorism [40]. Traffickers who enjoy these 
kinds of ‘political favors’ include transnational criminal organisations such as the Chechen and 
Russian mafias [41]. Groups of this type, who by virtue of the opium trade become financially 
stronger, affect people’s sense of security by engaging in arms dealing, corruption, bank fraud, 
and money laundering [42]. Greater financial strength has as well allowed some of these groups 
to divert finances to separatist groups in Chechnya [43]. This is of great concern vis-à-vis 
international security, as there is fear that the Chechen conflict might spillover the border and 
lead to regional instability [44]. 
Weakening the security of opiate users and their communities 
Afghani opiates and the various drugs derived from it are highly addictive. These addictive 
properties lead to over-consumption and abuse, which in turn enhances the likelihood of drug 
users dying. With an increasing supply of Afghani opiates, deaths are becoming more common. 
One telling statistic regarding the frequency of death is the fact that Afghani heroin alone is the 
cause of approximately 75,000 deaths every year [45]. As well as enhancing the likelihood of 
death, the use of Afghani heroin enhances the odds that an individual will contract a disease; 
HIV, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis C rates amongst users of Afghani heroin are disproportionately 
high, as many of these individuals inject the drug with contaminated needles [46].  
Along with the enhanced likelihood of death and disease, users of opiates experience 
greater than average human insecurity. This occurs because consumers often devote whatever 
money they have to quelling drug cravings rather than to satisfying basic needs such as hunger 
and shelter. When opiate consumers run out of money for quelling their drug cravings, they 
frequently turn to crime. For example, in England, which imports 90% of its heroin from 
Afghanistan [47], an estimated three quarters of heroin addicts partake in criminal activities to 
fund their habit [48]. Such drug induced criminal behaviour raises the level of insecurity in the 
community. 
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Policy options and recommendations 
Eradication 
Eradication is both a proactive and reactive counter-narcotic programme that is currently in 
use in Afghanistan. It works to proactively dissuade farmers from growing illicit crops. The 
rationale for this proactive approach is as follows: when faced with the prospects of their crops 
being destroyed, farmers will have greater incentive to abandon the cultivation of opium, and 
instead choose to grow legal crops. When farmers nonetheless cultivate opium, it seeks to 
reactively disrupt the drug trade by physically destroying the illicit crops [49].  
Eradication programmes are on the whole more successful and widespread in secure 
regions than they are in insecure regions. Due to the varying levels of security throughout the 
country, uneven patterns of eradication have emerged [50]. The effects of this imbalance are 
notable, as perceptions that the state is giving preferential treatment to certain ethnic and tribal 
groups have surfaced. Perceptions of this type are undesirable due to their ability to exacerbate 
pre-existing ethnic divisions that are prominent in the country [51]. Feelings of ill will also arise 
because eradication programmes destroy livelihoods. Without an income, farmers have a more 
difficult time satisfying basic needs and paying back loans on schedule. Consequently, some 
farmers may experience greater impoverishment and debt due to the eradication of their crops 
[52].  
Compensatory eradication schemes aim to ease the economic hardships that farmers may 
endure due to the eradication of their crop. This nuanced approach provides monetary 
reimbursements to poppy farmers who consent to having their crops eradicated [53]. Despite 
its good intentions, this scheme is undesirable as it inspires popular resentment vis-à-vis the 
government who runs the programme. Resentment arises because compensatory sums of 
money promised to farmers at times remain undelivered. When compensation does reach the 
farmers, the financial sums are small one-time payments that require foregoing significant long-
term payments [54]. Thus, compensatory and regular eradication programmes are 
inappropriate, as they have the ‘potential to feed the insurgency and terrorism by losing the 
hearts and minds of the people’ [55]. 
Interdiction 
Opium interdiction programmes are common in present day Afghanistan. The goal of 
interdiction is to decrease narcotics trafficking by seizing opium, destroying processing labs, 
and arresting high volume traffickers [56]. If the programme is successful, destruction will 
come upon the drug economy’s infrastructure, and imprisonment will come upon its 
participants. The greater chances of infrastructural damage and jail time will raise the costs of 
participation in the economy, which will in turn work to dissuade individuals from joining due 
to fear of imprisonment and financial loss. Consequently, farmers will lose incentive to 
cultivate the crop, as there will be substantially fewer customers for its product. However, the 
fact that interdiction programmes manage to alienate Afghani warlords provides a 
counterweight to its perceived virtues [57].  
In order to secure and stabilise Afghanistan, there is a need for local human intelligence. 
Warlords, who supply this type of intelligence, are often involved in the drug trade. Herein lies 
the problem, as it is unlikely that warlords will be willing to provide intelligence assistance to 
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the very same forces that are destroying their business [58]. Given how important it is to 
secure and stabilise Afghanistan, it is essential not to alienate warlords, and therefore, 
interdiction is not a viable short-term solution.  
Drug amnesty 
Amnesty programmes aim to minimise the impact warlords have on the opium economy, and 
to maximise the impact they have on security operations. Under the framework of such a 
programme, warlords will receive legal pardons for past wrongdoings in exchange for their 
future abstention from the opium economy [59]. With the removal of warlords and their 
associates from the drug trade, Afghani opiates will have more difficulty reaching consumption 
markets. Concurrently, farmers will have less incentive to cultivate the crop, as a smaller 
number of traffickers would be in demand for their product. 
The problem with this scheme is that the central government does not have the capacity 
to reprimand traffickers who are granted amnesty but nonetheless continue to partake in the 
drug trade. An inability to mete out punitive measures would undermine both the scheme and 
the government’s already shaken credibility in terms of its ability to deal harshly with traffickers 
[60]. Political ruin will also result if amnesty programmes take place at the same time as 
eradication programmes; implementing the two programmes concurrently will ensure that 
individuals who generate large profits receive judicial pardons, while farmers who earn a 
subsistence living from the crop will face potential prosecution and destruction of their income 
[61]. Due to these various drawbacks, amnesty programme are undesirable. 
Alternative development programmes 
Alternative development (AD) programmes aim to reduce drug production by offering 
economic alternatives to a rural population otherwise dependent on cultivating illegal narcotics 
[62]. The scope of programmes currently employed in Afghanistan is wide and varied. ‘Crop 
diversification’ programmes urge farmers to cultivate legal crops such as wheat, potatoes, or 
fruits rather than opium [63]. ‘Cash for work’ programmes offer locals the opportunity to 
partake in wage work on important and necessary projects [64]. ‘Microfinance’ programmes 
offer loans to rural Afghanis, which in turn allow them to escape the cycle of indebtedness 
associated with opium-as-credit loans, and as well allow them to start a new business or buy a 
new type of seed [65]. These programmes are in theory quite efficacious and appropriate for a 
society trying to transition away from a drug economy. However, programmes of this type 
have to date failed somewhat in their mission in Afghanistan. 
Many regions in Afghanistan lack a secure environment, and this insecurity is influential, 
as it makes it more difficult for some AD programmes to succeed. For example, Taliban threats 
ordering farmers to grow opium have undermined ‘crop substitution’ schemes, while insurgent 
attacks on road workers have undermined ‘cash for work’ programmes [66]. Economic issues 
are also influential, as the aid received by AD programmes to date is less than what donors 
initially pledged. When aid does indeed arrive, government and aid agencies that are in charge 
of the programmes oftentimes mismanage it [67]. Political factors, similar to security and 
economic factors, negatively affect AD programmes in Afghanistan. Most notably, the presence 
of politicians who siphon aid money into their personal coffers is negatively influencing the 
programme [68]. Given the lack of security, economic means, and political determination in 
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Afghanistan, there is a need to scale back the goals of AD programmes in the short-term, as the 
present goals are too ambitions for the current environment. 
State building 
In the absence of effective short-term policies for combating the opium problem in 
Afghanistan, there is a need to adopt a comprehensive long-term policy focusing on state 
building [69]. State building is a time consuming process, with multiple steps. Establishing and 
maintaining security, rule of law, and due process in the country is the top priority. Large-scale 
development programmes and public awareness campaigns, which depend on security and rule 
of law, are the next step. The last step involves implementing eradication and interdiction 
programmes. However, these counter-narcotic programmes may only take place after the 
previous steps succeed in their missions. Closer examination of each of these steps will occur 
in the following sections. 
Security, rule of law and due process 
In modern day Afghanistan, a very lawless culture has arisen, and this culture is one of criminal 
impunity. The presence of such a culture influences the illegal opium economy. For example, 
individuals increasingly join the lucrative opium economy due to the knowledge that their 
actions are likely to go unpunished. Other individuals who happily operate outside the 
economy often end up within it, as coercive elements that are unafraid of legal repercussions 
force them to join. What is driving these types of actions, and more generally the culture of 
impunity, is the fact that the central government is unable to assert its sole and sovereign 
authority in all regions of Afghanistan.  
Criminal impunity is rampant in some Afghani regions due to a lack of security. The 
presence of insecurity is partly the fault of international forces, who have been, and continue to 
be, somewhat unsuccessful in their mission to secure Afghanistan [70]. These failures make it 
tougher for the central government to establish its authority, as its personnel and infrastructure 
are constantly under threat of attack. Concomitantly, these failures have led to the emergence 
of ‘shadow governments’ who thrive off the absence of rule of law and due process, and 
therefore promote actions that undermine the central government’s authority. 
Bureaucratic factors as well contribute to the rise of culture of criminal impunity. 
Afghanistan’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) agenda has not yet established strong, effective, 
and accountable institutions and law enforcement agencies that can create and maintain 
security, rule of law, and due process [71]. Reasons for the SSR’s shortcomings include a lack of 
funding, a poor structural organisation, and the presence of deep-rooted corruption [72]. In 
order to rid the country of the culture of criminal impunity, there is a need to strengthen 
foreign and domestic apparatuses so they can better establish security, rule of law, and due 
process.  
Additional foreign troops, as requested by commanders on the ground [73], should deploy 
to Afghanistan to help suppress destabilising forces. As for Afghanistan’s security sector, it 
must become strong, effective, and accountable at a more accelerated pace. To accomplish 
this, a single party such as the UN, the United States, or Afghanistan should assume control of 
the SSR agenda in hopes of implementing a more coherent and balanced strategy than is 
currently in place [74]. Additional aid to augment the relatively low funding enjoyed by the SSR 
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agenda is as well necessary for eliminating some of the ills plaguing the programme [75]. 
Moreover, there is a need to abandon the counter-narcotic pillar due to its capacity to alienate 
vital segments of the population. 
With these modifications in place, the security situation will improve, and apparatuses that 
can maintain security will develop at a more rapid pace. Greater security and stability will 
enable the state to uphold the rule of law and due process more effectively, and the dominance 
of the culture of impunity will decrease. As impunity decreases, participants in the opium 
economy will be more reluctant to participate as the risks of breaking the law and facing 
punishment will be greater. Those who do nonetheless choose to participate will encounter 
legal repercussions at a greater frequency than they do now. The end result will be fewer 
participants, and with fewer participants, the magnitude and severity of the opium problem in 
Afghanistan will decrease.  
Alternative development programmes 
The perceived failure of AD programmes in Afghanistan does not mean that they are inherently 
flawed. In fact, given the right conditions, programmes of this nature have the capacity to 
succeed as part of a long-term process. Success however, depends on satisfying the right 
conditions. Firstly, it is of the utmost importance that local and international forces secure and 
stabilise Afghanistan. Second, donor nations need to deliver on their promises, and hand over 
all previously pledged aid that has yet to arrive in Afghanistan [76]. Lastly, it is necessary to 
strengthen the civil and governmental bodies currently overseeing the programme, as these 
programmes are inefficient and lack in determination. To achieve this, there is a need to 
modify existing bodies or create new bodies such as to rid the programme of corruption and 
mismanagement. These bodies will supervise the programmes, and as well muster support for 
the programmes domestically and around the world. If, and when, these conditions are 
satisfied, alternative development programmes can and should proceed on a large scale. 
Licensing opium 
At present, according to the World Health Organisation, there is a global shortage of opium-
based medicines such as morphine and codeine. The incongruity between the global demand 
and the global supply is especially notable in the developing world [77]. Afghanistan has the 
capacity to bridge this gap between supply and demand, by developing a system of opium 
licensing to complement other AD programmes in the country. Under this system, which has 
received support both from within Afghanistan and from around the world [78], farmers will 
receive a license to grow opium for conversion into legal medicines.  
From an international law viewpoint, this proposal is a viable one for Afghanistan, 
because the country is a signatory to the three UN treaties regulating drug policy. In accordance 
with the treaties, Afghanistan may produce opium for medicinal purposes. Afghanistan may 
also convert the opium into medicine and subsequently export these medicines. In order to 
cultivate, convert, and export opium and its derivative medicines, all that is required is the 
establishment of a national agency to oversee the licensing process [79]. From an agricultural 
viewpoint, this proposal is as well viable for Afghanistan, as evident by the fact that it projects 
to produce over 6,1000 tonnes of opium in 2006 [80]. From a security standpoint, Afghanistan 
is somewhat lacking, as destabilising forces may try to sabotage the programme, and thus it is 
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essential to secure regions where this programme will take place. With security in place and the 
licensing system under way, the desirability of the programme will become evident, as it will 
work to undermine the illicit opium economy [81].  
 The supply of opium diverted to the illegal economy will decrease because farmers will 
likely join the legal opium economy. Incentive for doing so results from the fact that growing 
opium legally allows them to operate within the confines of the law while still earning a 
comparable livelihood [82]. The supply of operatives in the opium economy may as well 
decrease, as some may join the workforce in factories that convert opium to medicines. 
Despite these benefits, the supply of operatives and illicit opium is unlikely to disappear 
completely.  
However, the scale of the entire opium economy will be smaller than it is now, and this is 
preferable in a number of ways. Instead of 100% of Afghani opium reaching the illegal market, 
only some opium will end up there [83]. The smaller scale of the illegal opium economy will as 
well enable Afghani authorities to deal with the opium problem more effectively; a smaller 
illegal drug economy means there are fewer people to incarcerate, fields to eradicate, and 
processing labs to interdict. Afghani institutions and law enforcement agencies will also be 
more effective due to increased funding generated by taxing the legal opium economy [84].  
Education and public awareness 
Many Afghanis view opium in a positive light due to its economic usefulness. In a bid to curb 
the opium economy, there is a need to appeal to the population’s intellect, and educate them 
regarding the negative impact of opium. Enhanced knowledge of this sort may deter Afghanis 
from cultivating, trafficking, and consuming the narcotic. One way of enhancing the 
population’s knowledge is by conducting a public awareness campaign. The scope of 
information encompassed in the public awareness campaign will be broad and comprehensive. 
It will focus on how opium harms the country’s security, its economic growth, and its 
international reputation. The fact that opium is illegal, injurious, and un-Islamic will as well be 
a focal point of the campaign [85]. Government organisations, civil groups, educational 
institutions, and the media will be responsible for disseminating the campaign’s message [86].  
A public awareness campaign of this sort is not a novel idea, as one is currently in place in 
Afghanistan. However, there are some flaws with the current campaign. Primarily, there is a 
problem with hypocrisy: individuals and institutions that publicly educate the masses and 
condemn the narcotic are often complicit in the drug trade. When this occurs, the thrust of the 
message loses some of its strength. To avoid this, there is a need to ensure that all parties 
involved in heightening awareness practice what they preach. One way for making this happen 
is by establishing rule of law and due process, which will minimise the number of people 
involved with the drug, including those who are in charge of delivering the message to the 
masses. Thus, the main difference between this public awareness campaign and the one 
currently taking place in Afghanistan will be the elimination of hypocrisy amongst those 
delivering the message. 
Counter-narcotic operations 
There is a need to suspend all interdiction and eradication programmes, as at present time they 
are inappropriate strategies for Afghanistan. However, programmes of this type should start up 
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again once an appropriate environment manifests. An environment deemed appropriate is one 
that is marked by security, rule of law, due process, and bountiful alterative livelihood options. 
The reasoning for why such an environment is integral for the resumption of interdiction and 
eradication programmes is as follows.  
As counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism efforts reach successful completion, the 
importance of warlords as sources of intelligence will diminish. When this occurs, the issue of 
whether or not interdiction alienates them becomes irrelevant [87]. The presence of many 
alternative livelihood options will deprive farmers of their current rationale for growing opium, 
which focuses on how it is their sole means of earning a living. As a result, crop eradication 
will become less alienating, and opium fields not licensed by the government should and will 
face eradication. 
Conclusion 
The illegal opium economy in Afghanistan is not a recent phenomenon. To date, there has 
been a reliance on traditional approaches to combat the drug problem in the country. This 
must stop. There are no quick and easy solutions. Instead, there are only long and multi-
layered solutions, which need commitment, support, and open-mindedness. The world 
community must understand this, and act upon it. Otherwise, the opium economy will 
continue to dominate in Afghanistan, and insecurity will continue to plague much of the 
international community 
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